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NOTES
AGRICULTURAL & RURAL DEVELOPMENT
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) in plant breeding are
being introduced or strengthened in developing coun-
tries as a result of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the
World Trade Organization. Further pressure for the
adoption of IPRs in agriculture comes from bilateral
trade negotiations and export-oriented agribusiness.
Farmers’ organizations and nongovernmental organi-
zations that represent the interests of farmers need to
know how to respond to these pressures and to par-
ticipate in debates about appropriate IPRs. Such
organizations are likely to offer blanket opposition to
strengthened IPRs on plant varieties, but their interests
will be better served by a more informed approach.
This brief, which is based on a field study in five devel-
oping countries (China, Colombia, India, Kenya,
Uganda) and a large number of stakeholder interviews
(Louwaars et al., 2005), is directed at helping farmers
and their organizations gain a clearer understanding
of the issues in the debate regarding IPRs. 
IPRs are meant to stimulate innovation. They provide
temporary exclusivity on the commercialization of the
protected invention. The holder of the right can pro-
hibit the use of the invention by others and negotiate
conditions (normally royalty payments) for its use
under a license contract. To be useful for society, the
rights and obligations of the right holder and the
users have to be well balanced. Different IPR systems
are appropriate for different types of inventions. In
plant breeding, plant breeder’s rights (and, more
recently, patents) are the principal mechanisms,
although trademarks and trade secret protection are
also important. We briefly distinguish between plant




Although living organisms have traditionally been
excluded from patent protection, pressures to promote
plant breeding in several industrialized countries
(including pressure from farmers’ organizations) result-
ed in the development of specially adapted IPRs for
plant varieties beginning in the 1930s. Many of these
plant breeder’s rights (PBR) laws were harmonized fol-
lowing the Convention on the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants in 1961, which also established an
intergovernmental body, the Union for the Protection
of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), to support and 
oversee the new system. These so-called sui generis
protection systems included two important conditions:
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2a farmers’ privilege, allowing farmers to reuse (and in
some cases exchange and sell) the seed, and a breeder’s
exemption, allowing anyone to use the protected vari-
eties for further breeding.
In addition, patents are now beginning to play a role in
plant breeding. A number of decisions by the U.S. Patent
Office ntroduced patent protection for living organisms
used in industry, as well as for genes, biotechnologies,
and plant varieties used in agriculture. Many of these
decisions were confirmed by court cases that provided
new interpretations of the patent law. Farmers have not
been involved in this extension of the patent system to
plant breeding. Patents on plant varieties provide much
stronger protection to the inventor and do not take into
account the customary rights of farmers. Although
patents on plant varieties are granted only in the United
States, Japan, and Australia, biotechnology patents can
be granted in many more countries and can influence
access to plant varieties and seeds.
It is important to note that IPRs are based on national
laws and that protection granted in one country may not
be valid in other countries, either because protection
was never applied for or because of differences in
national laws. There is no such thing as a global patent
or plant breeder’s right. 
FARMERS’ INTERESTS 
Why would farmers be interested in a legal instrument
that is likely to make them pay more for seed? The
answer is that farmers are the immediate beneficiaries of
new varieties, and they benefit from increased invest-
ments in breeding. Even though the immediate link
between IPRs and investment in plant breeding is debat-
ed, and the study showed a very weak link between the
introduction of IPRs and the emergence of a private seed
sector, farmers have an interest in creating incentives to
develop better planting materials. The farmers’ privilege
creates a useful balance between the rights of breeders
and those of farmers. However, revisions of the UPOV
convention (representing the needs of the industrialized
member countries of UPOV) have gradually strength-
ened the rights of the breeders at the expense of farm-
ers’ flexibility. The 1991 convention allows breeders to
prohibit farmers from saving seed of protected varieties,
unless specifically excluded, and prohibits any seed
exchange of protected varieties among farmers. UPOV
now accepts new member countries only if they adhere
to the 1991 convention.
A major difficulty for farmers’ organizations in develop-
ing countries in adopting an appropriate position on IPRs
in plant breeding is that different farmers have different
interests. The interests of commercial farmers are quite
close to those in industrialized countries, whereas those
of smallholders may be very different (box 1). An IPR sys-
tem that limits the degree of seed saving obviously
offers much stronger incentives to plant breeders, but
such restrictions may severely limit local seed provision,
particularly where competitive and efficient commercial
seed systems are not in place.  
Box 1. Different Farmers’ Interests 
in IPRs: Two Contrasting Examples
Flower producers in Kenya or Colombia, for
example, may get higher prices for new varieties
of roses than for standard varieties. Novelty pays
in the flower market—traders and consumers
pay more for new colors and flower types. Flower
breeders get their share of this profit by charging
higher royalty fees.They are thus very careful to
ensure that their market is not spoiled by illegal
production, and they are more likely to introduce
their newest flower varieties in countries where
their control over the planting materials is
ensured by strong IPR laws. Flower farmers gen-
erally have no problems with an effectively imple-
mented protection system based on the latest
UPOV convention.
Smallholder farmers commonly obtain new vari-
eties through informal channels. Rural develop-
ment policies may support such channels for dif-
fusing modern varieties of grains and legumes
(called “lateral spread” in countries in South Asia)
to stimulate uptake and for reasons of food secu-
rity. IPR laws that attempt to limit such lateral
spread of modern varieties act against the inter-
ests of these smallholder farmers.
Source: Authors
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Decisions about what level of farmers’ privilege is appro-
priate in national IPR legislation are further complicated
by the related concept of farmers’ rights. The
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) confirms the important role
of farmers in conserving, improving, and making avail-
able the genetic resources used in modern breeding,
and establishes the concept of farmers’ rights (box 2).
The treaty confirms the right to save, use, exchange,
and sell seed, the implementation of which is, however,
subject to national law.
The restriction on saving seed in UPOV 1991 (and even
stronger restrictions provided by patent laws) creates a
conflict between the two concepts that has to be
resolved at the national level. In many countries, private
rights (IPRs) seem to have priority over communal rights.
A major question is whether the farmers’ rights should
apply to all situations or whether farmers can agree to
limit these rights for their own benefit (e.g., for prof-
itable export crops, such as described in box 1). 
In some countries (e.g., India, Thailand), the right of
farmers to protect their own local varieties is included in
national IPR legislation. This protection is not in conflict
with conventional IPR systems, but several points
deserve attention. If this right is to be implemented by
relaxing the standards for application (especially unifor-
mity standards for the variety), there is a risk that it can
be misused to protect broader gene pools rather than
individual varieties. Others argue that IPRs on varieties
conflict with the moral values of farming communities
that have always relied on free exchange of materials,
and that such protection should not be promoted for
farmers’ varieties. Finally, protection itself serves a pur-
pose only when the variety is commercialized on a suffi-
ciently large scale to cover at least the cost of protec-
tion. At the very least, an IPR system should avoid grant-
ing protection for farmers’ varieties without the consent
of the community that developed them. 
THE ROLE OF FARMERS’
ORGANIZATIONS
Farmers’ associations and nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) that represent farmers need to be involved
in the national debate on agricultural IPRs. The concept
of farmers’ rights in the ITPGRFA obliges countries to
involve farmers in decision making relevant to plant
genetic resources, including IPR systems for plant vari-
Box 2. Article 9 of the IT PGRFA: Farmers’ Rights
9.1 The Contracting Parties recognise the enormous contribution that the local and indigenous commu-
nities and farmers of all regions of the world, particularly those in the centers of origin and crop diver-
sity, have made and will continue to make for the conservation and development of plant genetic
resources which constitute the basis of food and agriculture production throughout the world.
9.2 The Contracting Parties agree that the responsibility for realizing Farmers’ Rights, as they relate to
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, rests with national governments. In accordance with
their needs and priorities, each Contracting Party should, as appropriate, and subject to national leg-
islation, take measures to protect and promote Farmers’ Rights, including:
(a) protection of traditional knowledge relevant to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture;
(b) the right to equitably participate in sharing benefits arising from the utilization of plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture; and
(c) the right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related to the con-
servation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.
9.3 Nothing in this article should be interpreted as to limit the rights that farmers have to save, use,
exchange and sell farm-saved seed/propagating material, subject to national law and as appropriate.
Source: International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
 
eties and genes. Organizations that represent farmers
thus need to develop consultation mechanisms with
their members on this issue and to develop a well-
informed capacity to involve them in decision-making
processes. At the same time, national political systems
need to ensure adequate opportunities for open debate
about IPR legislation. 
The challenge of enforcing IPR legislation offers a sec-
ond justification for ensuring a strong political voice for
farmer organizations in the development of IPR legisla-
tion. If farmers have not participated in the debate and
helped define the nature of IPRs for plant varieties, the
enforcement of these rights is liable to be problematic.
Wide differences in success among European Union (EU)
countries in enforcing royalty payments on saved seed,
and the current controversy over royalty collection for
transgenic soybean varieties widely sown in Argentina
and Brazil, illustrate this point. 
The fact that IPRs can help stimulate the development of
a stronger commercial seed system offers an additional
justification for involving farmer organizations in the
development of IPR legislation. The commercial seed sec-
tor will thrive in developing countries only if farmers are
well acquainted with the rules and regulations that gov-
ern the companies that offer their products to farmers. 
STRIKING A BALANCE
It is unlikely that all farmers’ organizations and NGOs in
a country will adopt a similar stance on IPR legislation,
given the range of interests of different types of farmers.
Countries’ legal systems differ, and the balance between
export-oriented farming, production for national mar-
kets, and subsistence agriculture will also vary. It is not
reasonable to expect blueprint advice on the design of
an optimum IPR law. 
However, the yes-or-no discussion on IPRs that is occur-
ring in many countries today is not very productive.
Efforts should concentrate on balancing the different
interests. The five-country study concluded that there is
no reason for developing countries to adopt overly
restrictive plant variety protection systems; adoption of
such systems to acquire trade benefits reduces options
for broader support of rural development objectives. The
report stressed that opportunities exist to create a useful
balance within the minimum requirements offered by
the TRIPS Agreement. Important elements are the right
of farmers to save, use, exchange, and/or sell seed; the
right to use protected materials for further breeding;
and protection against appropriation of farmers’ vari-
eties for commercial purposes.
The interests of different groups of farmers can be
served by providing different levels of protection within
one legal framework. This can be done by either provid-
ing a minimum level of protection and adding rules for
specific crops or farmers (e.g., export crops can be pro-
tected according to the UPOV 1991 model and subsis-
tence crops by a less restrictive system), or by designing
a stronger IPR system but carefully delimiting exceptions.
For instance, smallholder farmers should be free to save
their own seed of protected varieties, while commercial
farmers are not (as is the case in the EU for seed pro-
tected by both plant breeder’s rights and patents).
In countries where the rights are weaker, it is important
to recognize that private sector incentives for investment
will be correspondingly lower, and that public-sector
plant breeding will need to be well financed to provide
the necessary support.
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